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chore: bump up Rust crate rustls to v0.23.45 [SECURITY] - #15679
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Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## canary #15679 +/- ##
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Coverage 54.61% 54.62%
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Files 4022 4022
Lines 192928 192928
Branches 31267 31276 +9
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+ Hits 105374 105379 +5
+ Misses 83582 83573 -9
- Partials 3972 3976 +4
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This PR contains the following updates:
0.23.37→0.23.45Rustls: TLS 1.3 handshake messages incorrectly accepted across encryption level boundaries
GHSA-2mjx-qc3c-rqvc
More information
Details
Rustls accepted TLS 1.3 handshake messages sent at the wrong encryption level when they followed a key-changing message in the same record. The handshake transcript is still authenticated, so a network-position attacker cannot use this to alter or complete a handshake; the practical effect is that a peer could send handshake messages that should be encrypted in plaintext without rustls rejecting the connection.
This issue affects rustls versions 0.23.13 through 0.23.44 inclusive.
Original report
Summary
Rustls (tested version 0.23.44, and it appears still an issue on latest master though I have not tested this) accepts a TLS 1.3 server flight where a plaintext EncryptedExtensions is packed into the same record as the ServerHello.
This is very similar to Go's CVE-2025-61730 fixed in golang/go@5046bdf
Details
It appears
Deframer::alignedconsiders itself aligned as long as all messages remaining in the buffer are complete. Rustls processes the ServerHello, installs the handshake keys, then pulls the complete (plaintext) EncryptedExtensions out of the buffer.This is insufficient per RFC 8446 section 5.1's
Impact
An on path attacker can inject plaintext messages that are accepted.
Tool Use Disclosure
This was discovered by a new TLS/DTLS test suite currently under construction. The specific testcase was inspired by the Go CVE. Other tested implementations (Botan, OpenSSL, BoringSSL, Go, wolfSSL) reject this protocol flow. Daybreak Blue reviewed the rustls code to identify probable root cause.
Severity
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NReferences
This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).
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