The Siliguri Corridor is the strip of Indian territory within the red highlighted circle.
AH2 of the Asian Highway goes through the Siliguri Corridor.
Dimensions of the corridor. Distances in kilometers.

The Siliguri Corridor, often dubbed the "Chicken's Neck", is a stretch of land around the city of Siliguri in West Bengal state of India.[1][2] It is the sole terrestrial connection between India's mainland and its eight northeastern states, serving as a logistical lifeline for over 40 million people and crucial military movements.[3][1] Bordered by Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, it lies close to Tibet's Chumbi Valley to its northeast.[4][5][6] The city of Siliguri is the major city in the area and the central transfer point connecting Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sikkim, Darjeeling, Northeast India and mainland India.[4]

History

The partition of India led to the formation of the Siliguri Corridor through the creation of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) after the partition of Bengal (into East Bengal and West Bengal) in 1947–1948.[7]

The Kingdom of Sikkim formerly lay on the northern side of the corridor, until its union with India in 1975 via a publicly held referendum.[8][9] From Sikkim, India consolidated its control of the Chumbi Valley, along with Bhutan.[10][11]

Geography

The dimensions of the corridor are a matter of interpretation.[12] Descriptions give it an area of 170 by 60 km (106 by 37 mi) with the narrowest section being 20–22 km (12–14 mi).[1][2] Kamal Jit Singh places the length at 200 km (120 mi) with a width of 17 to 60 km (11 to 37 mi), giving it an area of approximately 12,200 km2 (4,700 sq mi).[12] Another description places its dimensions as approximately 200 km (120 mi) in length and 20 to 60 km (12 to 37 mi) wide, also giving it an area of approximately 12,200 km2 (4,700 sq mi).[13]

The corridor is located between Bangladesh to the southeast, Nepal on the northwest, and Bhutan to the north.[14] Between Sikkim and Bhutan lies the Chumbi Valley Tibetan territory.[15] The southern end of the Dolam plateau or Doklam tri boundary area slopes into the corridor.[16] At the narrowest stretch, the corridor is generally formed by the Mechi River in the east; Nepal's Bhadrapur lies on the banks of the river.[17] Further north the Mechi Bridge connects Mechinagar.[18][19]

Vulnerability mitigation by India

To mitigate its vulnerability India has undertaken several initiatives including enhanced security deployment and infrastructure development. To ensure seamless connectivity and military mobilization, India has prioritized developing high-capacity infrastructure in and around the corridor, notably under the Bharatmala Pariyojana. Projects include:[6]

  • Corridor Enhancement: Upgrading of major broad-gauge railway lines and highways to increase freight capacity and reduce transit time.[6]
  • Alternative Routes: Exploration and development of alternative connectivity solutions to reduce reliance on the single-access corridor, including the proposed Hili–Mahendraganj Corridor and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Corridor through Myanmar.[20]
  • Future Infrastructure: Consideration of subterranean infrastructure (tunnels) within the corridor to enhance security and reduce exposure to external threats.[6]

Connectivity

India has embarked on a slew of projects. These include the construction of India-China Border Roads, where, as of 2024, multiple phases of border roads have been constructed, and Advance Landing Grounds (ALGs), such as the Nyoma Advanced Landing Ground, which is nearing completion as of 2024.[21][22][23] Other projects include Northeastern India connectivity and Look-East transnational connectivity projects including BIMSTEC and BBIN to create multiple alternatives to the Silliguri corridor, including through Bangladesh and the sea.

All land transportation between the rest of India and its far northeastern states use this corridor. The route has a major broad gauge railway line. Electrification of this double-track corridor is in progress with assistance from the Central Organization for Railway Electrification (CORE). Additionally, the old metre gauge line (recently converted to a 1.676 metres (5 ft 6.0 in) broad-gauge line) connects Siliguri Junction with Islampur in the North Dinajpur district of West Bengal, via Bagdogra (the only airport of national interest in the corridor) and the bordering towns of Adhikari, Galgalia, Thakurganj, Naxalbari and Taiabpur with Nepal. As of 2024, to reduce dependence on the Siliguri Corridor, India is planning to build railway lines through Jogbani in Bihar, which would enter Biratnagar in Nepal and then connect with New Mal Junction in West Bengal.[24] In 2024, India also began developing railway lines through Bangladesh; this project includes the construction of new railway tracks and the gauge conversion of existing railway tracks, in order to reduce dependence on the Siliguri Corridor.[25]

As of 2024, there is no free-trade agreement between Bangladesh and India.[26] The Tetulia Corridor, an alternative to the Siliguri Corridor, is proposed under Article VIII of the 1980 India–Bangladesh Trade Agreement, which states that "The two governments agree to make mutually beneficial arrangements for the use of their waterways, railways and roadways for commerce between the two countries and for passage of goods between two places in one country through the territory of the other".[27] However, the opening of the Tetulia Corridor is still being discussed politically as of 2019.[27]

Security

The threat of a Chinese advance is still considered by Indian planners.[28] A Chinese military advance of less than 130 km (81 mi) would cut off Bhutan, part of West Bengal and all of Northeast India, an area containing almost 50 million people. This situation arose in 1962 during the war between India and China.[15] The security threat to this corridor was heightened during the 2017 Doklam incident.[29] The probability of China cutting off seven states in northeast India has been questioned.[30] The Indian Army has said that the Siliguri Corridor is the Army's strongest defensive line.[31]

Military Bases and Deployment

India has several forces stationed on its borders: the Indian Army and Indo-Tibetan Border Police man the border with China, Sashastra Seema Bal is deployed along the border with Nepal and Bhutan, and the Border Security Force is stationed at the border of Bangladesh.[12] The strip is also patrolled by the Indian Army, the Assam Rifles, and state police forces, including the West Bengal Police.[12] The security threat posed by the corridor decreased following the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.[28] However, numerous internal threats to the corridor still exist.[28] Militant groups known to have used the corridor include the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN).[13]

  • Advanced defensive assets already stationed in the area include air defense systems (such as the S-400), a BrahMos missile regiment and a squadron of the Indian Air Force's Rafale fighter aircraft based at Hasimara Air Force Station.[31][32]
  • The corridor and the surrounding region are secured by multiple military formations, primarily the Indian Army's Trishakti Corps (XXXIII Corps), which guards the corridor and the state of Sikkim.[31][33] In a significant move to reinforce its eastern frontier, India established three new military garrisons in late 2025 to boost surveillance, readiness, and coordination with the Border Security Force (BSF):[33]
    • Lachit Borphukan Military Station at Bamunigaon (near Dhubri, Assam). This is the first major Army base near the Bangladesh border in Assam.[34][35]
    • Forward Bases at Kishanganj (Bihar) and Chopra (West Bengal), which are intended for rapid troop deployment and intelligence coordination.[3]

Counter Chicken-neck corridors and their relevance

Anti-India hardliners in Bangladesh and Pakistan refer to the Siliguri Corridor as India's Chicken's neck.[citation needed] However, both nations have comparable land corridors along their respective borders with India. If Pakistan or Bangladesh try to exploit India's chicken neck vulnerability, India can exploit their vulnerability in their similar respective Chicken neck corridors.[according to whom?] This way India can impose geopolitical symmetry of mutual vulnerability, elevate the severity of economic risks to Bangladesh, deter border brinkmanship by Bangladeshi hardliners, and disrupt Bangladesh's trade through Chittagong Port, which handles over 90% of Bangladesh's international maritime trade, as Bangladesh's Rangpur and Chittagong are flanked by India.[36][37][38][39] Bangladeshi writer Jaidul[who?] has characterized the back-and-forth sniping between Indian media outlets and politicians and Bangladeshi Islamist hardliners regarding opposing Chicken Neck vulnerabilities as rhetoric.[40][41][42] However, Indian geostrategic think tanks[which?] and analysts, such as Bharat Karnad, point out that in case of any misadventure by Bangladesh, India can annex the Rangpur Division which is one of the two chicken neck vulnerabilities of Bangladesh, or India can offer to buy it for $10-$20 billion, thus helping Bangladesh reduce its outstanding debt of $104 billion. Alternatively Bangladesh could provide "an absolute and enforceable guarantee with a treaty that it will not, under any circumstances, create a strategic nexus or work militarily in concert with China (or Pakistan)".[38][41][42]

Security analysts like Dr Shahnawaz of the Islamic University of Science & Technology highlight that Bangladesh obtained its independence from Pakistan with the help of India and that the two countries have shared historical, cultural and geographical ties. As a result, a change in one nation affects the other, and an influx of Bangladeshi migrants in India is effectively an expansion of Bangladesh beyond its political borders. According to Shahnawaz, Islamic radicalization in Bangladesh "has serious security implications on internal security of India and particularly on North east region ... subsequently these radical organizations have developed links with groups active in north east region" of India.[43] India and Bangladesh enjoyed excellent bilateral relations during the Awami League (AL)'s rule, which was disrupted after overthrow of AL's Sheikh Hasina government and anti-India rhetorics of Bangladeshi hardliners.[42][36][37] Security of India and Bangladesh are inter-linked, both have much to gain from the peaceful stable bilateral relationship and lot to lose without it which also negatively affacts their neighbors.[41][42][according to whom?]

According to the World Bank, both India and Bangladesh will benefit economically if they collaborate to unstrangle the Chicken's Neck by building transport corridors from Mainland India to North East India through Bangladesh. They stated this would create jobs and also benefit neighbouring countries like Nepal and Bhutan, ensuring mutual economic growth.[39] This view is also supported by the United Nations's ESCAP study, which cites SAARC's Regional Multimodal Transport Study (SRMTS), that Bangladesh can tap into opportunities by being the regional connectivity and transport hub between land locked North East India, Nepal, and Bhutan.[44]

Bangladesh

Bangladeshi leader Hasnat Abdullah of the centrist National Citizen Party has rhetorically threatened to cut off India's northeastern states by cutting off India's chicken's neck, i.e. Siliguri Corridor. He also downplayed India's contribution in 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War.[45][46] Like India, Bangladesh also has two chicken's necks along its border. These corridors, comprising 50,715 km2 or 34.2% of Bangladesh's total territory, are narrower and more vulnerable than India's Siliguri Corridor or Tripura Corridor, and contribute 30-45% to the economy of Bangladesh. 80% of Bangladesh's total exports and imports are routed through the Chittagong Port in this vulnerable area.[36][37] In response to rhetoric from several Bangladeshi political figures and hardliners highlighting India's "Chicken's Neck" vulnerability, Indian leaders have pointed out that Bangladesh itself possesses two narrow land corridors that are geographically isolated and potentially more vulnerable.[47] These counter-vulnerabilities, which could be exploited in the event of aggression, are described as North Bangladesh Corridor (Rangpur Division) and Chittagong Corridor (a slender strip, reportedly 28 kilometres at its narrowest, connecting the port city of Chittagong - the economic capital- with the political capital of Dhaka).[47] This diplomatic and strategic counter-narrative serves as a warning that any hostile action aimed at the Siliguri Corridor could result in severe repercussions for Bangladesh's own territorial integrity and economic connectivity.[48]

  • Rangpur chicken's neck, the northern part of Bangladesh's Rangpur Division contiguous to India's Siliguri Corridor is narrower. While Siliguri Corridor is nearly 20 km long at its narrowest section, the 80 km long northern Rangpur Division is only nearly 10 to 15 km long at its narrowest vulnerable section and making this area more vulnerable the narrowest section runs along the Karatoya River which isolates it from the rests of Bangladesh. This 16,185 km2 area, which constitutes 10.9% of Bangladesh's total area, contributes significantly to economy of Bangladesh especially in rice, jute, agriculture, food security and transport.[36][37] This area is surrounded by India on three and half sides by almost 320-330 degree.

Pakistan

Akhnoor Bulge[56] (named "Akhnoor Dagger" by Pakistani Military,[57][58] and as "Pakistan's Akhnoor Chicken's neck Corridor" by Indian Military)[58][59][60] a narrow strip of Pakistani territory that extends into the Indian administered-Jammu and Kashmir south of Akhnoor. This sensitive piece of land, which lies on the de facto Indo–Pakistani border on the west side of the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, is part of Punjab Province's Sialkot District and measures roughly 170 km2 (66 sq mi).[58][59][60] However, this Akhnoor Bulge being a "dagger" or India's "Chicken's Neck" vulnerability, as perceived by Pakistan in 1965, has since been described by some analysts as a strategic myth, "the so-called 'Chicken's Neck' or Akhnoor Dagger area... proved to be a liability for Pakistan rather than an asset in the 1971 war when Indian forces successfully captured the area".[61] This is evidenced by India's swift 1971 capture of the area, which effectively negated the perceived threat to Akhnoor.[62] Any perceived vulnerability of India is further mitigated by improved infrastructure development by India, which now has many more high-capacity bridges and numerous alternate transport links connecting Jammu to Akhnoor and India to wider Jammu and Kashmir region, providing redundancy and resilience to the military supply lines.[63] In fact, the area has been argued to be a Pakistani vulnerability, as the land is a narrow doab between the Chenab and Tawi rivers surrounded by India from three sides, and is further doubly-isolated from the rest of Pakistan by the Chenab–Munawar Tawi doab to its southwest within Pakistan.[61]

Humphrey Hawksley, in his 2000 novel Dragon Fire, briefly authors a situation where China cuts off India's land route to its northeastern territories.[13] Assassin's Mace (2011) by Brigadier Bob Butalia also involves such a situation involving Doklam and Jaldhaka River.[12]

See also

Notes

  1. 1 2 3 Singh, Mayank (7 November 2021). "Army steps up efforts to safeguard Siliguri Corridor". The New Indian Express. Retrieved 16 January 2022.
  2. 1 2 Singh, Mohinder Pal (9 October 2019). "What if China wrings India's 'Chicken's Neck' – the Siliguri corridor? Here are some countermeasures". The Times of India. Archived from the original on 18 January 2022. Retrieved 16 January 2022 – via USI India.
  3. 1 2 "India's New Military Bases Along the Siliguri Corridor: Strategic Defense or Signal Of Changing Regional Dynamics? – Analysis". Eurasia Review. 25 November 2025.
  4. 1 2 "Chickens neck". The Times of India. 3 July 2017. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 4 April 2025.
  5. ↑ Sethi, Sunil (18 February 2015). "Status of Sikkim and its deposed monarch Palden Thondup Namgyal being questioned again". India Today. Retrieved 4 April 2025.
  6. 1 2 3 4 "Siliguri Corridor". GKToday. 31 May 2025.
  7. ↑ Atig Ghosh, The Importance of Being Siliguri (2018), p. 136.
  8. ↑ "Sikkim Votes On Indian Merger". Daytona Beach Morning Journal. 15 April 1975. Retrieved 28 January 2018.
  9. ↑ "Sikkim Voters OK Merger With India". Sarasota Herald-Tribune. 16 April 1975. Retrieved 28 January 2018.
  10. ↑ Gupta, Shishir (30 October 2019). "China's early harvest plan on Sikkim border has no takers in India". Hindustan Times. Retrieved 4 April 2024.
  11. ↑ Srivastava, Utkarsh (7 July 2017). "Sikkim standoff: Strategic importance of Siliguri corridor and why India should be wary of China". Firstpost. Retrieved 4 April 2024.
  12. 1 2 3 4 5 Singh, Lt Gen (Retd) KJ (9 July 2017). "India ready, theoretically: 'Threats' to Siliguri Corridor war-gamed". Tribune India. Retrieved 21 January 2022.
  13. 1 2 3 Bhattacharya, Pinaki (2001). "The Shiliguri Corridor: Question Mark on Security". South Asia Terrorism Portal. Retrieved 21 January 2022.
  14. ↑ Marcus Franda, "Bangladesh, The First Decades", South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1982, p-126
  15. 1 2 Partha S. Ghosh, "Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia", UPL, Dhaka, 1989, p-43
  16. ↑ Myers, Steven Lee; Barry, Ellen; Fisher, Max (26 July 2017). "How India and China Have Come to the Brink Over a Remote Mountain Pass". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
  17. ↑ Dixit, Kanak Mani (1 August 2002). "Chicken's Neck". Himal Southasian. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
  18. ↑ "Approval of MoU between India & Nepal for laying down implementation arrangement for construction of new Bridge over Mechi River at Indo-Nepal border". Business Standard India. 23 August 2017. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
  19. ↑ Khanal, Radha (26 November 2020). "Asian Highway now connected with Nepal". The Annapurna Express. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
  20. ↑ "Siliguri Corridor and India's Strategic Connectivity". Current Affairs Usthadian Academy. 3 August 2025.
  21. ↑ "Boost for security forces! Phase 3 of India-China border roads project started; to give impetus to road network in eastern Ladakh". The Times of India. 29 July 2024. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 5 April 2025.
  22. ↑ Sharma, Shivani (2 November 2024). "India's highest airfield in Ladakh almost complete, to boost security near LAC". India Today. Retrieved 5 April 2025.
  23. ↑ Pandit, Rajat (5 October 2024). "China outpacing India in technology, defence production & infrastructure, says IAF chief". The Times of India. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 5 April 2025.
  24. ↑ Bhattacharya, Pinak Priya (16 July 2024). "India plans rail tracks through Nepal to bypass Chicken's Neck". The Times of India. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 7 April 2025.
  25. ↑ Bhattacharya, Pinak Priya (16 June 2024). "New rail lines for Northeast via Bangladesh to bypass 'Chicken's Neck'". The Times of India. ISSN 0971-8257. Retrieved 7 April 2025.
  26. ↑ "Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions". India Today. 6 August 2024. Retrieved 4 April 2025.
  27. 1 2 Sarkar, Debasis (12 March 2019). "India to India Tetulia corridor to resurface as a major election issue". The Economic Times. ISSN 0013-0389. Retrieved 4 April 2024.
  28. 1 2 3 Joshi, Manoj (10 July 2017). "Chink In The Checker's Board". ORF/ Outlook. Archived from the original on 3 October 2018.
  29. ↑ Singh, D. K. (11 August 2018). "This is the first official account of the India-China face-off in Doklam". ThePrint. Retrieved 21 January 2022.
  30. ↑ Asthana, Alok (1 August 2017). "Does It Make Military Sense for India to Mount the Barricades at Doklam?". The Wire. Retrieved 22 January 2022.
  31. 1 2 3 Sharma, Shivani (4 April 2025). Jha, Anuja (ed.). "India fortifies 'Chicken's Neck' as Bangladesh, China eye strategic corridor". India Today. Retrieved 4 April 2025.
  32. ↑ "Shielding the Eastern Frontier: India Strengthens Siliguri Corridor, Establishes Three New Garrisons". Raksha Anirveda. 14 November 2025.
  33. 1 2 Trivedi, Saurabh (16 November 2025). "India strengthens eastern defences with three new garrisons near Siliguri 'Chicken's Neck'". The Hindu.
  34. ↑ "India sets up three new military garrisons along Bangladesh border to fortify 'Chicken's Neck'". The Economic Times. 8 November 2025.
  35. ↑ "New military station in Assam to boost border security, intelligence" (PDF). 12 November 2025. Retrieved 27 June 2026.
  36. 1 2 3 4 5 भारत के 'टू नेक ट्रैप' में आया बांग्लादेश तो बड़ा भू-भाग खो देगा यूनुस का देश!, MSN News, 10 Dec 2025.
  37. 1 2 3 4 5 Bangladesh has '2 chicken necks', far more vulnerable, says Himanta Sarma, Business Standard, 26 May 2025.
  38. 1 2 Widen the Siliguri Corridor, annex Rangpur Division of Bangladesh (Augmented), bharatkarnad.com, 21 December 2025.
  39. 1 2 Can South Asia Unstrangle the Chicken's Neck?, World Bank, 26 June 2019.
  40. ↑ Indian media reports and statements from politicians have recently identified Bangladesh's Feni region and adjacent areas as that nation's "Chicken's Neck.", Eurasia Review, 12 Nov 2025.
  41. 1 2 3 PriyaDarshini Baruah, (2025), "India-Pakistan Crisis and Bangladesh's Anti-India Rhetoric", Defence and Diplomacy In Pursuit of National Security (April-June 2025), Centre for Air Power Studies, Vol. 14 No. 3.
  42. 1 2 3 4 J Bhattacharya, 2024, Post-Hasina India-Bangladesh Relations: Implications for Northeast India, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, Volume 28, Issue 2.
  43. ↑ Dr Shahnawaz Mantoo, January 2023, RADICALIZATION IN BANGLADESH AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS ON INDIA, Centre for International Relations at Islamic University of Science and Technology, Vol-13, Issue-1, No. 2.
  44. ↑ M Rahmatullah, 2009, Regional Connectivity: Opportunities for Bangladesh to be a Transport Hub, Journal of Bangladesh Institute of Planners, Vol. 2, https://doi.org/10.3329/jbip.v2i0.9553.
  45. ↑ Bangladesh's student leader Hasnat Abdullah threatens to isolate India's seven sisters if country is destabilised, UNI, 16 Dec 2025.
  46. ↑ Bangladesh student leader warns India—'will isolate Seven Sisters, give refuge to separatists', ThePrint, 16 Dec 2025.
  47. 1 2 Singh, Rimjhim (26 May 2025). "Bangladesh has '2 chicken necks', far more vulnerable, says Himanta Sarma". Business Standard.
  48. ↑ "After Muhammad Yunus's 'landlocked' jibe, Assam chief minister Himanta Biswa Sarma maps out Bangladesh's vulnerable 'chicken necks'". Telegraph India. 26 May 2025.
  49. ↑ Can South Asia Unstrangle the Chicken's Neck?, World Bank, 26 June 2019.
  50. ↑ The Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (2000). 'Life Is Not Ours': Land and Human Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh – Update 4 (Report). International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. p. 20.
  51. ↑ Chakma, Kabita; Hill, Glen (2013). "Indigenous Women and Culture in the Colonized Chittagong Hills Tracts of Bangladesh". In Visweswaran, Kamala (ed.). Everyday Occupations: Experiencing Militarism in South Asia and the Middle East. University of Pennsylvania Press. pp. 132–157. ISBN 978-0812244878.
  52. 1 2 Yegar, Moshe (1972). Muslims of Burma. Wiesbaden: Verlag Otto Harrassowitz. p. 96.
  53. ↑ Hodal, Kate (20 December 2012). "Trapped inside Burma's refugee camps, the Rohingya people call for recognition". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 1 August 2017. Retrieved 25 September 2017.
  54. ↑ "Myanmar Army Evacuates Villagers, Teachers From Hostilities in Maungdaw". Radio Free Asia. Archived from the original on 17 October 2016. Retrieved 16 October 2016.
  55. ↑ Bangladesh will not let in any more Rohingya refugees, reuters, 7 Feb 2024.
  56. ↑ "Srinagar airbase is vulnerable to Pakistan attack. These are ways to secure it". ThePrint. 21 May 2025. Retrieved 10 December 2025. Future PAF operations, potentially coordinated with ground manoeuvres from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) or a thrust into the Akhnoor Bulge, could involve a larger, more sustained assault.
  57. ↑ P. S. Bhagat (1974) [1966]. The Shield and the Sword: India 1965 and After, the New Dimensions (2nd ed.). Vikas. ISBN 9780706902914.
  58. 1 2 3 JS Sodhi (2024). China's War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate. Blue Rose. pp. 114-115. ISBN 9789362614575.
  59. 1 2 A tale of two 'Chicken's Necks': How India's armed forces kept Pakistan and China at bay, Scroll.in, 29 Feb 2020.
  60. 1 2 A strategic grip on the Chicken's neck, deccanherald.com, 17 July 2025.
  61. 1 2 Pattanaik, Smruti S. (May 2018). "The Role of Geography in India–Pakistan Conflict". Security and Foreign Policy Journal. 2 (1): 45–58.
  62. ↑ Singh, Lt Gen RK Jasbir (October–December 2021). "Battle of Chhamb: Indo-Pak War 1971" (PDF). United Service Institution of India. The Indian move into the Chicken's Neck... negated the 'dagger' threat to Akhnoor.
  63. ↑ "Akhnoor to Jammu Connectivity Boost: New Bridge Project Sanctioned". Times Now. 12 March 2024. Retrieved 10 December 2025.
Bibliography
  • Ghosh, Atig (2018). "The Importance of Being Siliguri. Border-Effect and the 'Untimely' City in North Bengal". In Neilson, Brett; Rossiter, Ned; Samaddar, Ranabir (eds.). Logistical Asia: The Labour of Making a World Region. Palgrave Macmillan, Springer. ISBN 9789811083334. LCCN 2018935185.

Further reading

26°35′N 88°15′E / 26.583°N 88.250°E / 26.583; 88.250

source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siliguri_Corridor