A grey parrot peers into the camera
According to the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, "near human-like levels of consciousness" have been observed in the grey parrot.[1]

Animal consciousness, or animal awareness, is the quality or state of self-awareness within an animal, or of being aware of an external object or of something within itself.[2][3] In humans, consciousness has been defined as: sentience, awareness, subjectivity, qualia, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind.[4] Despite the difficulty in definition, many philosophers believe there is a broadly shared underlying intuition about what consciousness is.[5]

The topic of animal consciousness is beset with a number of difficulties. It poses the problem of other minds in an especially severe form because animals, lacking the ability to use human language, cannot communicate their experiences.[6] It is also difficult to reason objectively about the question because a denial that an animal is conscious is often taken to imply that they do not feel, their life has no value, and that harming them is not morally wrong.[7] For example, the 17th-century French philosopher René Descartes is sometimes criticised for enabling animal mistreatment through his animal machine view, which claimed that only humans are conscious.[8]

Philosophers who consider subjective experience the essence of consciousness also generally believe, as a correlate, that the existence and nature of animal consciousness can never rigorously be known. The American philosopher Thomas Nagel spelled out this point of view in an influential essay titled What Is it Like to Be a Bat? He said that an organism is conscious "if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism"; and he argued that no matter how much we know about an animal's brain and behavior, we can never really put ourselves into the mind of the animal and experience their world in the way they do themselves.[9] Other thinkers, such as the cognitive scientist Douglas Hofstadter, dismiss this argument as incoherent.[10] Several psychologists and ethologists have argued for the existence of animal consciousness by describing a range of behaviors that appear to show animals holding beliefs about things they cannot directly perceive—Walter Veit's 2023 book A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness reviews a substantial portion of the evidence.[3]

Animal consciousness has been actively researched for over one hundred years.[11] In 1927, the American functional psychologist Harvey Carr argued that any valid measure or understanding of awareness in animals depends on "an accurate and complete knowledge of its essential conditions in man".[12] A more recent review concluded in 1985 that "the best approach is to use experiment (especially psychophysics) and observation to trace the dawning and ontogeny of self-consciousness, perception, communication, intention, beliefs, and reflection in normal human fetuses, infants, and children".[11] In 2012, a group of neuroscientists signed the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, which "unequivocally" asserted that "humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neural substrates."[13] In 2024, more than 500 academics and scientists signed the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness. The declaration states that there is strong scientific support for consciousness in mammals and birds and that it is a realistic possibility in other vertebrates and many invertebrates. It calls for these considerations to be taken into account in decisions affecting animals.[14]

Philosophical background

René Descartes argued that consciousness is unique to humans and explained animal behaviour through his mechanistic account of animals.

The mind–body problem in philosophy examines the relationship between mind and matter, and in particular the relationship between consciousness and the brain. A variety of approaches have been proposed. Most are either dualist or monist. Dualism maintains a rigid distinction between the realms of mind and matter. Monism maintains that there is only one kind of stuff, and that mind and matter are both aspects of it. The problem was addressed by pre-Aristotelian philosophers,[15][16] and was famously addressed by René Descartes in the 17th century, resulting in Cartesian dualism. Descartes believed that humans alone possess a non-physical mind, interpreting animal behaviour through a mechanistic model that denied animal consciousness.[17]

The rejection of the mind–body dichotomy is found in French Structuralism, and is a position that generally characterized post-war French philosophy.[18] The absence of an empirically identifiable meeting point between the non-physical mind and its physical extension has proven problematic to dualism and many modern philosophers of mind maintain that the mind is not something separate from the body.[19] These approaches have been particularly influential in the sciences, particularly in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology, and the neurosciences.[20][21][22][23]

Epiphenomenalism

Epiphenomenalism is the theory in philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are caused by physical processes in the brain or that both are effects of a common cause, as opposed to mental phenomena driving the physical mechanics of the brain. The impression that thoughts, feelings, or sensations cause physical effects, is therefore to be understood as illusory to some extent. For example, it is not the feeling of fear that produces an increase in heart beat, both are symptomatic of a common physiological origin, possibly in response to a legitimate external threat.[24]

The history of epiphenomenalism goes back to the post-Cartesian attempt to solve the riddle of Cartesian dualism, i.e., of how mind and body could interact. La Mettrie, Leibniz and Spinoza all in their own way began this way of thinking. The idea that even if the animal were conscious nothing would be added to the production of behavior, even in animals of the human type, was first voiced by La Mettrie (1745), and then by Cabanis (1802), and was further explicated by Hodgson (1870) and Huxley (1874).[25][26] Huxley (1874) likened mental phenomena to the whistle on a steam locomotive. However, epiphenomenalism flourished primarily as it found a niche among methodological or scientific behaviorism. In the early 1900s scientific behaviorists such as Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson, and B. F. Skinner began the attempt to uncover laws describing the relationship between stimuli and responses, without reference to inner mental phenomena. Instead of adopting a form of eliminativism or mental fictionalism, positions that deny that inner mental phenomena exist, a behaviorist was able to adopt epiphenomenalism in order to allow for the existence of mind. However, by the 1960s, scientific behaviourism met substantial difficulties and eventually gave way to the cognitive revolution. Participants in that revolution, such as Jerry Fodor, reject epiphenomenalism and insist upon the efficacy of the mind. Fodor even speaks of "epiphobia"—fear that one is becoming an epiphenomenalist.[citation needed]

Thomas Henry Huxley defends in an essay titled On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History an epiphenomenalist theory of consciousness according to which consciousness is a causally inert effect of neural activity—"as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence upon its machinery".[27] To this William James objects in his essay Are We Automata? by stating an evolutionary argument for mind-brain interaction implying that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological evolution is a result of natural selection, it is plausible that consciousness has not only been influenced by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this if it had been efficacious.[28][29] Karl Popper develops in the book The Self and Its Brain a similar evolutionary argument.[30]

Animal ethics

Bernard Rollin of Colorado State University, the principal author of two U.S. federal laws regulating pain relief for animals, writes that researchers remained unsure into the 1980s as to whether animals experience pain, and veterinarians trained in the U.S. before 1989 were simply taught to ignore animal pain. In his interactions with scientists and other veterinarians, Rollin asserts that he was regularly asked to prove animals are conscious and provide scientifically acceptable grounds for claiming they feel pain.[31] The denial of animal consciousness by scientists has been labelled as mentophobia by Donald Griffin.[32] Academic reviews of the topic are equivocal, noting that the argument that animals have at least simple conscious thoughts and feelings has strong support,[33] but some critics continue to question how reliably animal mental states can be determined.[34][35] A refereed journal Animal Sentience launched in 2016 by the Institute of Science and Policy of The Humane Society of the United States is devoted to research on this and related topics.[36]

Defining consciousness

About forty meanings attributed to the term consciousness can be identified and categorized based on functions and experiences. The prospects for reaching any single, agreed-upon, theory-independent definition of consciousness appear remote.[37]

Consciousness is an elusive concept that presents many difficulties when attempts are made to define it.[38][39] Its study has progressively become an interdisciplinary challenge for numerous researchers, including ethologists, neurologists, cognitive neuroscientists, philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists.[40][41]

In 1976, Richard Dawkins wrote, "The evolution of the capacity to simulate seems to have culminated in subjective consciousness. Why this should have happened is, to me, the most profound mystery facing modern biology."[42] In 2004, eight neuroscientists felt it was still too soon for a definition. They wrote an apology in "Human Brain Function", in which they stated:[43]

We have no idea how consciousness emerges from the physical activity of the brain and we do not know whether consciousness can emerge from non-biological systems, such as computers... At this point the reader will expect to find a careful and precise definition of consciousness. You will be disappointed. Consciousness has not yet become a scientific term that can be defined in this way. Currently we all use the term consciousness in many different and often ambiguous ways. Precise definitions of different aspects of consciousness will emerge ... but to make precise definitions at this stage is premature.

Consciousness is sometimes defined as the quality or state of being aware of an external object or something within oneself.[44][45] It has been defined somewhat vaguely as: subjectivity, awareness, sentience, the ability to experience or to feel, wakefulness, having a sense of selfhood, and the executive control system of the mind.[4] Despite the difficulty in definition, many philosophers believe that there is a broadly shared underlying intuition about what consciousness is.[5] Max Velmans and Susan Schneider wrote in The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness: "Anything that we are aware of at a given moment forms part of our consciousness, making conscious experience at once the most familiar and most mysterious aspect of our lives."[46]

Related terms, also often used in vague or ambiguous ways, are:[citation needed]

  • Awareness: the state or ability to perceive, to feel, or to be conscious of events, objects, or sensory patterns. In this level of consciousness, sense data can be confirmed by an observer without necessarily implying understanding. More broadly, it is the state or quality of being aware of something. In biological psychology, awareness is defined as a human's or an animal's perception and cognitive reaction to a condition or event.
  • Self-awareness: the capacity for introspection and the ability to reconcile oneself as an individual separate from the environment and other individuals.
  • Self-consciousness: an acute sense of self-awareness. It is a preoccupation with oneself, as opposed to the philosophical state of self-awareness, which is the awareness that one exists as an individual being; although some writers use both terms interchangeably or synonymously.[47]
  • Sentience: the ability to be aware (feel, perceive, or be conscious) of one's surroundings or to have subjective experiences. Sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which is otherwise commonly used to collectively describe sentience plus other characteristics of the mind.
  • Sapience: often defined as wisdom, or the ability of an organism or entity to act with appropriate judgment, a mental faculty which is a component of intelligence or alternatively may be considered an additional faculty, apart from intelligence, with its own properties.
  • Qualia: individual instances of subjective, conscious experience.

Sentience (the ability to feel, perceive, or to experience subjectivity) is not the same as self-awareness (being aware of oneself as an individual). The mirror test is sometimes considered to be an operational test for self-awareness, and the handful of animals that have passed it are often considered to be self-aware.[48][49] It remains debatable whether recognition of one's mirror image can be properly construed to imply full self-awareness,[50] particularly given that robots are being constructed which appear to pass the test.[51][52]

Much has been learned in neuroscience about correlations between brain activity and subjective, conscious experiences, and many suggest that neuroscience will ultimately explain consciousness; "...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells...".[53] However, this view has been criticized because consciousness has yet to be shown to be a process,[54] and the so-called "hard problem" of relating consciousness directly to brain activity remains elusive.[55]

Scientific approaches

Since Descartes's proposal of dualism, it became general consensus that the mind had become a matter of philosophy and that science was not able to penetrate the issue of consciousness – that consciousness was outside of space and time. However, in recent decades many scholars have begun to move toward a science of consciousness. Antonio Damasio and Gerald Edelman are two neuroscientists who have led the move to neural correlates of the self and of consciousness. Damasio has demonstrated that emotions and their biological foundation play a critical role in high level cognition,[56][57] and Edelman has created a framework for analyzing consciousness through a scientific outlook. The current problem consciousness researchers face involves explaining how and why consciousness arises from neural computation.[58][59] In his research on this problem, Edelman has developed a theory of consciousness, in which he has coined the terms primary consciousness and secondary consciousness.[60][61]

Eugene Linden, author of The Parrot's Lament suggests there are many examples of animal behavior and intelligence that surpass what people would suppose to be the boundary of animal consciousness. Linden contends that in many of these documented examples, a variety of animal species exhibit behavior that can only be attributed to emotion, and to a level of consciousness that we would normally ascribe only to our own species.[62]

Philosopher Daniel Dennett counters:

Declarations

Cambridge Declaration

Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness

The absence of a neocortex does not appear to preclude an organism from experiencing affective states. Convergent evidence indicates that non-human animals have the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states along with the capacity to exhibit intentional behaviors. Consequently, the weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing the neurological substrates that generate consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, and many other creatures, including octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.[156]

In 2012, a group of neuroscientists attending a conference on "Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals" at the University of Cambridge in the UK, signed the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (see box on the right).[1][157]

This declaration "unequivocally" asserts:[1]

  • "The field of Consciousness research is rapidly evolving. Abundant new techniques and strategies for human and non-human animal research have been developed. Consequently, more data is becoming readily available, and this calls for a periodic reevaluation of previously held preconceptions in this field. Studies of non-human animals have shown that homologous brain circuits correlated with conscious experience and perception can be selectively facilitated and disrupted to assess whether they are in fact necessary for those experiences. Moreover, in humans, new non-invasive techniques are readily available to survey the correlates of consciousness."[1]
  • "The neural substrates of emotions do not appear to be confined to cortical structures. In fact, subcortical neural networks aroused during affective states in humans are also critically important for generating emotional behaviors in animals. Artificial arousal of the same brain regions generates corresponding behavior and feeling states in both humans and non-human animals. Wherever in the brain one evokes instinctual emotional behaviors in non-human animals, many of the ensuing behaviors are consistent with experienced feeling states, including those internal states that are rewarding and punishing. Deep brain stimulation of these systems in humans can also generate similar affective states. Systems associated with affect are concentrated in subcortical regions where neural homologies abound. Young human and non-human animals without neocortices retain these brain-mind functions. Furthermore, neural circuits supporting behavioral/electrophysiological states of attentiveness, sleep and decision making appear to have arisen in evolution as early as the invertebrate radiation, being evident in insects and cephalopod mollusks (e.g., octopus)."[1]
  • "Birds appear to offer, in their behavior, neurophysiology, and neuroanatomy a striking case of parallel evolution of consciousness. Evidence of near human-like levels of consciousness has been most dramatically observed in grey parrots. Mammalian and avian emotional networks and cognitive microcircuitries appear to be far more homologous than previously thought. Moreover, certain species of birds have been found to exhibit neural sleep patterns similar to those of mammals, including REM sleep and, as was demonstrated in zebra finches, neurophysiological patterns previously thought to require a mammalian neocortex. Magpies in particular have been shown to exhibit striking similarities to humans, great apes, dolphins, and elephants in studies of mirror self-recognition."[1]
  • "In humans, the effect of certain hallucinogens appears to be associated with a disruption in cortical feedforward and feedback processing. Pharmacological interventions in non-human animals with compounds known to affect conscious behavior in humans can lead to similar perturbations in behavior in non-human animals. In humans, there is evidence to suggest that awareness is correlated with cortical activity, which does not exclude possible contributions by subcortical or early cortical processing, as in visual awareness. Evidence that human and non-human animal emotional feelings arise from homologous subcortical brain networks provide compelling evidence for evolutionarily shared primal affective qualia."[1]

New York Declaration

In 2024, a conference on "The Emerging Science of Animal Consciousness" at New York University[158] produced The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness.[14] This brief declaration, signed by over 500 scientists and academics, asserts that, in addition to the strong scientific support for consciousness in mammals and birds agreed on by Cambridge, there is also empirical evidence which "indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects)."[14][159] The declaration further asserts that "when there is a realistic possibility of conscious experience in an animal, it is irresponsible to ignore that possibility in decisions affecting that animal".[14]

Examples

Theories of brain evolution in animals. The old scala naturae model versus the modern approach.

A common image is the scala naturae, the ladder of nature on which animals of different species occupy successively higher rungs, with humans typically at the top.[160] A more useful approach has been to recognize that different animals may have different kinds of cognitive processes, which are better understood in terms of the ways in which they are cognitively adapted to their different ecological niches, than by positing any kind of hierarchy.[161][162]

Mammals

Dogs

Dogs were previously listed as non-self-aware animals. Traditionally, self-consciousness was evaluated via the mirror test. But dogs, and many other animals, are not (as) visually oriented.[163][164] A 2015 study by biologist Roberto Cazzolla Gatti argues that the "sniff test of self-recognition" (STSR) provides evidence of self-awareness in dogs and that apparent species differences may reflect the methods used to assess it, rather than a capacity confined to great apes, humans, and a few other animals. The study further suggests adopting a species-specific, rather than anthropocentric, approach to research on animal consciousness.[86][165][failed verification]This study has been confirmed by another study.[166][failed verification]

Birds

Grey parrots

Research with captive grey parrots, especially Irene Pepperberg's work with an individual named Alex, has demonstrated they possess the ability to associate simple human words with meanings, and to intelligently apply the abstract concepts of shape, colour, number, zero-sense, etc. According to Pepperberg and other scientists, they perform many cognitive tasks at the level of dolphins, chimpanzees, and even human toddlers.[167] Another notable African grey is N'kisi, which in 2004 was said to have a vocabulary of over 950 words which she used in creative ways.[168] For example, when Jane Goodall visited N'kisi in his New York home, he greeted her with "Got a chimp?" because he had seen pictures of her with chimpanzees in Africa.[169]

In 2011, research led by Dalila Bovet of Paris West University Nanterre La Défense, demonstrated grey parrots were able to coordinate and collaborate with each other to an extent. They were able to solve problems such as two birds having to pull strings at the same time to obtain food. In another example, one bird stood on a perch to release a food-laden tray, while the other pulled the tray out from the test apparatus. Both would then feed. The birds were observed waiting for their partners to perform the necessary actions so their behaviour could be synchronized. The parrots appeared to express individual preferences as to which of the other test birds they would work with.[170]

Corvids

The Eurasian magpie passes the mirror test.

It was thought that self-recognition was restricted to mammals with large brains and highly evolved social cognition, but absent from animals without a neocortex. However, in 2008, an investigation of self-recognition in corvids was conducted to determine the ability of self-recognition in the magpie. Mammals and birds inherited the same brain components from their last common ancestor nearly 300 million years ago, and have since independently evolved and formed significantly different brain types. The results of the mirror test showed that although magpies do not have a neocortex, they are capable of understanding that a mirror image belongs to their own body. The findings show that magpies respond to the mirror test in a manner similar to that of apes, dolphins, killer whales, pigs and elephants.[69]

A 2020 study found that carrion crows show a neuronal response that correlates with their perception of a stimulus, which they argue to be an empirical marker of (avian) sensory consciousness – the conscious perception of sensory input – in the crows which do not have a cerebral cortex. The study thereby substantiates the theory that conscious perception does not require a cerebral cortex and that the basic foundations for it – and possibly for human-type consciousness – may have evolved before the last common ancestor >320 Mya or independently in birds.[171][111] A related study showed that the birds' pallium's neuroarchitecture is reminiscent of the mammalian cortex.[172]

A 2025 review applied a five-dimensional framework of consciousness to corvids, examining sensory, evaluative, temporal, and self-related aspects of their experience. Drawing on behavioural and neurological evidence, the authors argue that corvids exhibit sophisticated cognitive capacities across all dimensions, including high perceptual acuity, emotional evaluation, episodic-like memory, future planning, and possible forms of self-awareness and theory of mind. While not claiming definitive proof of consciousness, the review supports the growing consensus that corvids are plausible sentient beings and proposes they serve as a model group for the comparative study of non-mammalian consciousness.[173]

Invertebrates

Octopus travelling with shells collected for protection

Octopuses are highly intelligent, possibly more so than any other order of invertebrates. The level of their intelligence and learning capability are debated,[174][175][176][177] but maze and problem-solving studies show they have both short- and long-term memory. Octopus have a highly complex nervous system, only part of which is localized in their brain. Two-thirds of an octopus's neurons are found in the nerve cords of their arms. Octopus arms show a variety of complex reflex actions that persist even when they have no input from the brain.[178] Unlike vertebrates, the complex motor skills of octopuses are not organized in their brain using an internal somatotopic map of their body, instead using a non-somatotopic system unique to large-brained invertebrates.[179] Some octopuses, such as the mimic octopus, move their arms in ways that emulate the shape and movements of other sea creatures.[citation needed]

In laboratory studies, octopuses can easily be trained to distinguish between different shapes and patterns. They reportedly use observational learning,[180] although the validity of these findings is contested.[174][175] Octopuses have also been observed to play: repeatedly releasing bottles or toys into a circular current in their aquariums and then catching them.[181] Octopuses often escape from their aquarium and sometimes enter others. They have boarded fishing boats and opened holds to eat crabs.[176] At least four specimens of the veined octopus (Amphioctopus marginatus) have been witnessed retrieving discarded coconut shells, manipulating them, and then reassembling them to use as shelter.[182][183]

Shamanistic and religious views

Shamanistic and other traditional cultures and folk tales speak of animal spirits and the consciousness of animals.[184][185] In India, Jains consider all the jivas (living organisms, including plants, animals and insects) to be conscious.[citation needed]

Researchers

Some contributors to relevant research on animal consciousness include:

See also

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Archive) 7 July 2012. Written by Philip Low and edited by Jaak Panksepp, Diana Reiss, David Edelman, Bruno Van Swinderen, Philip Low and Christof Koch. University of Cambridge.
  2. ↑ "Consciousness". Merriam-Webster. Retrieved 22 April 2014.
  3. 1 2 Veit, Walter (2023). A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness. New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-032-34361-7.
  4. 1 2 Farthing G (1992). The Psychology of Consciousness. Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-728668-3.
  5. 1 2 John Searle (2005). "Consciousness". In Honderich T (ed.). The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926479-7.
  6. ↑ Colin Allen (6 February 2024). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Animal consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition).
  7. ↑ Peter Carruthers (1999). "Sympathy and subjectivity". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 77 (4): 465–482. doi:10.1080/00048409912349231. S2CID 49227874.
  8. ↑ Miller, Michael R. (2013). "Descartes on Animals Revisited". Journal of Philosophical Research. 38: 89–114. doi:10.5840/jpr2013386.
  9. ↑ Thomas Nagel (1991). "Ch. 12 What is it like to be a bat?". Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-40676-5.
  10. ↑ Douglas Hofstadter (1981). "Reflections on What Is It Like to Be a Bat?". In Douglas Hofstadter; Daniel Dennett (eds.). The Mind's I. Basic Books. pp. 403–414. ISBN 978-0-7108-0352-8.
  11. 1 2 Burghardt, Gordon M (1985). "Animal awareness: Current perceptions and historical perspective" (PDF). American Psychologist. 40 (8): 905–919. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.40.8.905. PMID 3898938. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 September 2012.
  12. ↑ Carr, H (1927). "The interpretation of the animal mind". Psychological Review. 34 (2): 87–106 [94]. doi:10.1037/h0072244.
  13. ↑ Andrews, K. (2014). The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. Taylor & Francis. p. 51. ISBN 978-1-317-67676-8.
  14. 1 2 3 4 "The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness". The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness. 19 April 2024. Retrieved 25 February 2025.
  15. ↑ Robert M. Young (1996). "The mind-body problem". In RC Olby; GN Cantor; JR Christie; MJS Hodges (eds.). Companion to the History of Modern Science (Paperback reprint of Routledge 1990 ed.). Taylor and Francis. pp. 702–11. ISBN 978-0-415-14578-7.
  16. ↑ Robinson, Howard (3 November 2011). "Dualism". In Edward N. Zalta (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition).
  17. ↑ Hatfield, Gary (2024), "René Descartes", in Zalta, Edward N.; Nodelman, Uri (eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2024 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 24 May 2025
  18. ↑ Bryan S. Turner (2008). The Body and Society: Explorations in Social Theory (3rd ed.). Sage Publications. p. 78. ISBN 978-1-4129-2987-5. ...a rejection of any dualism between mind and body, and a consequent insistence on the argument that the body is never simply a physical object but always an embodiment of consciousness.
  19. ↑ Kim, Jaegwan (1995). "Emergent properties". In Honderich, Ted (ed.). Problems in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-19-866132-0.
  20. ↑ Pinel, J. (2009). Psychobiology (7th ed.). Pearson/Allyn and Bacon. ISBN 978-0-205-54892-7.
  21. ↑ LeDoux, J. (2002). The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are. Viking Penguin. ISBN 978-88-7078-795-5.
  22. ↑ Russell, S.; Norvig, P. (2010). Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed.). Prentice Hall. ISBN 978-0-13-604259-4.
  23. ↑ Dawkins, R. (2006). The Selfish Gene (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-929114-4.
  24. ↑ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Epiphenomenalism". Retrieved 27 December 2016.
  25. ↑ Huxley, T. H. (1874). "On the Hypothesis that Animals are Automata, and its History", The Fortnightly Review, n.s.16:555-580. Reprinted in Method and Results: Essays by Thomas H. Huxley (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1898)
  26. ↑ Gallagher, S. 2006. "Where's the action?: Epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will". In W. Banks, S. Pockett, and S. Gallagher. Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? An Investigation of the Nature of Intuition (109-124). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
  27. ↑ T. H. Huxley (1874). "On the hypothesis that animals are automata, and its history". The Fortnightly Review. 16 (253): 555–580. Bibcode:1874Natur..10..362.. doi:10.1038/010362a0.
  28. ↑ W. James (1879). "Are we automata?". Mind. 4 (13): 1–22. doi:10.1093/mind/os-4.13.1.
  29. ↑ B. I. B. Lindahl (1997). "Consciousness and biological evolution". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 187 (4): 613–629. Bibcode:1997JThBi.187..613L. doi:10.1006/jtbi.1996.0394. PMID 9299304.
  30. ↑ Karl R. Popper; John C. Eccles (1977). The Self and Its Brain. Springer International. ISBN 978-0-387-08307-0.
  31. ↑ Rollin, Bernard. The Unheeded Cry: Animal Consciousness, Animal Pain, and Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. xii, 117-118, cited in Carbone 2004, p. 150.
  32. ↑ Ricard, Matthieu (2016). A Plea for the Animals: The Moral, Philosophical, and Evolutionary Imperative to Treat All Beings with Compassion (First English ed.). Boulder: Shambhala. p. 132. ISBN 978-0-8348-4054-6. OCLC 960042213.
  33. ↑ Griffin, DR; Speck, GB (2004). "New evidence of animal consciousness" (PDF). Animal Cognition. 7 (1): 5–18. doi:10.1007/s10071-003-0203-x. PMID 14658059. S2CID 8650837. Archived from the original (PDF) on 21 January 2013. Retrieved 29 November 2013.
  34. ↑ The Ethics of research involving animals Archived 25 June 2008 at the Wayback Machine Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Accessed 27 February 2008
  35. ↑ Allen, C (1998). "Assessing animal cognition: ethological and philosophical perspectives". J. Anim. Sci. 76 (1): 42–7. doi:10.2527/1998.76142x. PMID 9464883. Archived from the original on 21 January 2016. Retrieved 5 October 2015.
  36. ↑ "Animal Sentience: An Interdisciplinary Journal on Animal Feeling". WellBeing International. Retrieved 25 February 2025.
  37. ↑ Vimal, RLP; Sansthana, DA (2010). "On the Quest of Defining Consciousness" (PDF). Mind and Matter. 8 (1): 93–121.
  38. ↑ Hirstein, William (January 2013). "Conscious States: where are they in the brain and what are their necessary ingredients?". Mens Sana Monographs. 11 (1): 230–238. doi:10.4103/0973-1229.109343 (inactive 11 July 2025). PMC 3653223. PMID 23678244.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of July 2025 (link)
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Further reading

Invertebrates
source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Animal_consciousness