Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Standards Track March 10, 2011
Expires: September 11, 2011
The RPKI Ghostbusters Record
draft-ietf-sidr-ghostbusters-01
Abstract
In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource
certificates completely obscure names or any other information which
might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with
issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs,
compromises, etc. This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record
containing human contact information to be signed (indirectly) by a
resource-owning certificate. The data in the record are those of a
severely profiled vCARD.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2011.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. vCARD Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
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1. Introduction
In the operational use of the RPKI it can become necessary to
contact, human to human, the party responsible for a resource-owning
certificate. An important example is when the owner of a Route
Origin Authorization (ROA) sees a problem, or an impending problem,
with a certificate or CRL in the path between the ROA and a trust
anchor. E.g., a certificate along that path has expired, is soon to
expire, or a CRL associated with a CA along the path is stale, thus
placing the quality of the routing of the address space described by
the ROA in jeopardy.
As the names in RPKI certificates are intentionally hashes which are
not meaningful to humans, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-cp], there is no way to
use a certificate itself to lead to the worrisome certificate's or
CRL's maintainer. So, "Who do you call?"
This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, an object
signed, indirectly via an End Entity (EE) certificate, by the
certificate whose maintainer may be contacted using the human usable
payload information in the Ghostbusters Record.
The Ghostbusters Record conforms to the syntax defined in
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].
Note that the Ghostbusters Record is not an identity certificate, but
rather an attestation to the contact data made by the issuer of the
certificate signing the Ghostbusters Record.
This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry
whois data. It gives information about an RPKI certificate
maintainer not a resource holder.
This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 4, is
the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled
vCARD. The second, Section 5, profiles the packaging of the payload
as a profile of the RPKI Signed Object Template specification
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]. The third, Section 6, describes the
proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], Signed RPKI Objects,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object], and vCARDs [RFC2426].
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3. RPKI Ghostbusters Record Payload Example
An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all fields
populated is as follows:
BEGIN:vCard
VERSION:3.0
FN:Human's Name
ORG:Organizational Entity
ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern; WA; 98666;U.S.A.
TEL;TYPE=VOICE,MSG,WORK:+1-666-555-1212
TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK:+1-666-555-1213
EMAIL;TYPE=INTERNET:human@example.com
END:vCard
4. vCARD Profile
The goal in profiling the vCARD is not to include as much information
as possible, but rather to include as few fields as possible while
providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the
maintainer of the RPKI data which threatens the ROA[s] of concern.
The Ghostbusters vCARD payload is a minimalist subset of the vCARD as
described in [RFC2426].
BEGIN - pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the
vCARD and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCARD" as described in
[RFC2426].
VERSION - pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the
vCARD and MUST have the value "VERSION:3.0" as described in 3.6.9
of [RFC2426].
FN - the name, as described in 3.1.1 of [RFC2426], of a contactable
person who responsible for the certificate.
ORG - an organization as described in 3.5.5 of [RFC2426].
ADR - a postal address as described in 3.2.1 of [RFC2426].
TEL - a voice and/or fax phone as described in 3.3.1 of [RFC2426].
EMAIL - an Email address as described in 3.3.2 of [RFC2426]
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END - pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCARD
and MUST have the value "END:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426].
The BEGIN, VERSION, and END lines MUST be included in a record. To
be useful, FN and one or more of ADR, TEL, and EMAIL SHOULD be
included.
5. CMS Packaging
The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object conforming to the
RPKI Signed Data Object Template, [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].
The ContentType of a Ghostbusters Record is defined as
rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of [TO BE ASSIGNED].
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
in the signerInfo object. See [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object].
eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in
Section 4 above.
Similarly to a ROA, the Ghostbusters Record is verified using an EE
certificate issued under the CA certificate associated with the
resource-holding certificate whose maintainer is described in the
vCARD.
The EE certificate used to verify the Ghostbusters Record is the one
that appears in the CMS data structure that contains the payload
defined above.
6. Validation
The validation procedure defined in Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object] is applied to a Ghostbusters Record.
After this procedure has been performed, the Version number field
within the payload is checked, and the OCTET STRING containing the
vCARD data is extracted. These data are checked against the profile
defined in Section 4 of this document. Only if all of these checks
pass is the Ghostbusters payload deemed valid and made available to
the application that requested the payload.
7. Security Considerations
Though there is no on the wire protocol in this specification, there
are attacks which could abuse the data described. As the data, to be
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useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoid this exposure.
Phone Numbers: The vCARDs may contain real world telephone numbers
which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc.
Email Addresses: The vCARDs may contain Email addresses which could
be abused for purposes of spam.
Relying parties are warned that the data in a Ghostbusters Record are
self-asserted. These data have not been verified by the CA that
issued a (CA) certificate to the entity that issued the EE
certificate used to validate the Ghostbusters Record.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Russ Housley for suggesting profiling the
vCARD specification, the authors of [I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object],
and particularly Stephen Kent.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-signed-object]
Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure",
draft-ietf-sidr-signed-object-03 (work in progress),
February 2011.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile",
RFC 2426, September 1998.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]
Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-12 (work in
progress), February 2011.
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[I-D.ietf-sidr-cp]
Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate
Policy (CP) for the Resource PKI (RPKI",
draft-ietf-sidr-cp-16 (work in progress), December 2010.
[I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]
Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure",
draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-07 (work in progress),
February 2011.
Author's Address
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com
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